Volume 7, Issue 1, April 2019
Feature Article

Lest We Forget the Realm of Armed Conflicts: A Guided Discussion on the Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law

Yugichha Sangroula
Assistant Professor, Kathmandu School of Law

Published 2021-03-05

Keywords

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How to Cite

Sangroula, Y. . (2021). Lest We Forget the Realm of Armed Conflicts: A Guided Discussion on the Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law. Kathmandu School of Law Review, 7(1), 1–50. https://doi.org/10.46985/kslr.v7i1.1349

Abstract

The paper is a doctrinal and a dialectic endeavour to comment on LOAC/IHL from a bird’s-eye view. It is the author’s initial attempt to contribute to an ongoing discussion on the theory and practice of LOAC/IHL, reflecting on the key issues relevant to Nepal. The question-answer approach is based on the author’s interactions with law students, colleagues, members from the police, military, victims, bureaucrats and politicians in the Nepali diaspora. The paper will benefit from the readers’ critique.

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References

  1. .1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 70, 72, 110, 153, 221, available at https://tinyurl.com/yyydkxba, accessed on 15 October 2020.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Clausewitz writes, “Paper laws… are self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning… one should be obeying no other but their own inner laws…and the law of probabilities”. Ibid, pp. 43, 50, 56.
  4. See generally Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, Oxford University Press, 2007; See generally Muhammad Alaraby, ‘The Whispering Prussian: Clausewitz and Modern Wars’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y2tmnj4l, accessed on 20 November 2020; See generally Colonel E.A. de Landmeter, ‘The relevance of Clausewitz's “On War” to today's conflicts’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ybf2dlek, accessed on 20 November 2020; See generally Olivia Garard, ‘The Objective Value of Clausewitz’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yxqvz8w5, accessed on 20 November 2020.
  5. See generally T. Lawrence, ‘Evolution of a Revolt’, in A. Lawrence (ed), Oriental Assembly, Williams and Norgate, 1940; See generally Mary Kaldor ‘Inconclusive Wars: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant in these Global Times?’ Global Policy p. 271, volume 1:3, 2010; See generally Wm. J. Olson, ‘The Continuing Irrelevance of Clausewitz’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y2vn9jw4, accessed on 20 November 2020.
  6. Landmeter (n 4).
  7. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Limits of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 17 (emphasis added).
  8. Echevarria II (n 4), p. 3.
  9. Using dialectics to understand warfare, Clausewitz countered some of his best known propositions and refined them, which is where some of his paradoxical contradictions stem from. Clausewitz seemingly died before he had a chance to locate and revise the paradoxes. See Hew Strachan, Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War, Oxford University Press, 2007 (abstract), available at https://tinyurl.com/y5lpo823, accessed on 20 November 2020.
  10. ICRC, ‘What are jus ad bellum and jus in bello?’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y87mvcz5, accessed on 20 November 2020.
  11. This has a contextual meaning. For an international armed conflict, the standard of a ‘general close of military operations and a general conclusion of peace’ is applicable. Gotovina Trial, Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Trial, 15 April 2011, Case no. ICTY-06-90, para. 1694; However, Geneva Convention III and IV stipulate that they will remain in application until the protected persons are repatriated. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, art. 5; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, art. 6(4); In case of a non-international armed conflict, a peaceful settlement of dispute is required. Tadic Interlocutory Appeals, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, ICTY-94-1-AR72, para. 70.
  12. Amanda Alexander, ‘A Short History of International Humanitarian Law’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yyslys45, accessed on 21 November 2020.
  13. For example, the titles of military manuals indicate the preference. For example, Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006), UK LOAC Manual (2004), Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001), France’s LOAC Manual (2001), South Africa’s LOAC Teaching Manual (2008), Spain’s LOAC Manual. In contrast, some states prefer LOAC/ IHL, for example, Italy’s LOAC/IHL Manual (1991), Peru’s LOAC/IHL Manual (2004), Sweden’s LOAC/ IHL Manual (1991).
  14. See generally Marco Sassoli et al, How Does Law Protect in War, ICRC, 2011, 3rd edition, volume 1, chapter IV.
  15. See ICRC, ‘Wounded, sick and shipwrecked protected under international humanitarian law’, available at goo.gl/VNtM6B, accessed on 21 November 2020.
  16. Sassoli (n 14), pp. 249-294.
  17. Ibid, chapters 6 and 8.
  18. See Yugichha Sangroula and Ravi Prakash Vyas, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Human Rights at Crossroads’, Researcher: a multidisciplinary journal, 2017, volume 1:1.
  19. ICRC, ‘Customary LOAC/IHL Database’, rule 128 (release and return of persons deprived of their liberty), available at https://tinyurl.com/yckrjx9x, accessed on 22 November 2020.
  20. Ibid, rule 117 (accounting for missing persons).
  21. ICRC, ‘Explosive Remnants of War’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yajj73s2, accessed on 7 August 2018.
  22. Elena Cirkovic, ‘Land Grabs and the Laws of War’ available at https://academies.hypotheses.org/2324, accessed on 7 August 2018.
  23. Clausewitz (n 1), p. 83.
  24. ICRC, Commentary the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Cambridge University Press, 2016, para. 193.
  25. Thilo Marauhn, Zacharie F. Ntoubandi, ‘Armed Conflict, Non-International’, Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law available at https://tinyurl.com/yx9gphba, accessed on 21 November 2020.
  26. See generally Dapo Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflict: Relevant Legal Concepts’ in E Wilmurst (ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, Oxford University Press, 2012, chapter 3.
  27. GC IV n (n 11), common art. 2.
  28. ICRC Commentary to GC I (n 24), paras. 236, 301, 304.
  29. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art. 1(4).
  30. Nepal, India and China are not parties to AP I, and one of the reasons cited is the inclusion of national liberation movements in the taxonomy of law of IAC.
  31. Tadic Interlocutory Appeal (n 11), para. 70.
  32. Tadic Trial, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Trial Judgement, 7 May 1997, ICTY-94-1, paras. 561-2.
  33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art. 1(1).
  34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), 17 July 1998, art. 8(2) (e).
  35. RULAC, ‘Conflicts’, available at https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts, accessed on 21 November 2020.
  36. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II) 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.
  37. As a matter of obligation, articles 1 and 3 common to the GCs would apply in a NIAC. Ibid.
  38. Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex, 18 October 1907, art. 42.
  39. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, paras. 233-7.
  40. ICRC Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 392.
  41. Four GCs (n 36), common article 1.
  42. Every war crime defined in the Elements of Crime requires a proof of the perpetrator’s knowledge of the factual circumstances establishing an armed conflict. See Elements of Crime to the ICC Statute, ICCRC/ 11, 2010.
  43. Four GCs (n 36), common article 2.
  44. Supreme Commander of PLA, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, expressed commitment towards the Geneva Conventions. Human Rights Watch, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal’s Civil War, October 2004, p. 10; Former PM Surya Bahadur Thapa announced concrete steps to protect LOAC. ‘Implementation of human rights and international humanitarian law’, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 26 February 2004.
  45. Elements of Crimes (n 42), p. 13.
  46. The factual determination mainly relies on prima facie evidence for academic purpose, and except for the judgements of the Supreme Court, such reports have to be considered questionable at the moment.
  47. Moeed W. Yusuf, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia, Foundation Books, New Delhi, pp. 190 3.
  48. Such as Operation Kilo Sierra II and Operation Cordon. Ibid, pp. 190-3.
  49. Ibid.
  50. Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 431.
  51. Human Rights Watch, Nepal, Waiting for Justice, Unpunished Crimes from Nepal’s Armed Conflict, 2008, p. 16.
  52. Yusuf (n 47), p. 190.
  53. ‘12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)’, available at goo.gl/U3cyUe, accessed on 5 November 2020.
  54. Sassoli, Antoine A Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does Law Protection in War?, vol III, 3rd edition, p. 2409.
  55. An active revolt or uprising. ‘Insurgency’, Oxford Dictionary available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.
  56. com/definition/insurgency, accessed on 23 November 2020.
  57. Tadic Interlocutory Appeals (n 11), para. 70.
  58. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, Adriot Publishers, Delhi, p. 22.
  59. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Nepal Conflict Report, 2012, p. 16.
  60. Ibid.
  61. Upreti (n 57), p. 33.
  62. Nepal Conflict Report (n 58).
  63. Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Coordination Committee (HRTMCC) Nepal, Field Report on Maoists Trapped Civilian Bus in Landmine at Bandarmudhe Stream in Madi of Chitwan District, 14 June, 2005, p. 2.
  64. Mercy Corps, Western Nepal Conflict Assessment Report, 2003, p. 76.
  65. ‘Judged by the People: The Maoists Grow Stronger’, The Economist, 5 October 2006.
  66. Mercy Corps (n 63), pp. 76-8.
  67. Ibid, p. 76.
  68. See for detail the concept of ‘overall control’ a foreign state has to exert on an OAG. Tadic Interlocutory Appeals (n 31), para. 120.
  69. Saubhagya Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadow of the Legal Raj’, in Micheal Hutt (ed), Himalayan People’s War – Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, Hurst and Company, London, 2004, pp. 192-224.
  70. Ibid.
  71. Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘The Coming War in Asia: Why It Is Hard to Imagine the Unimaginable’, the Diplomat, 3 August 2017.
  72. ICRC, ‘The Obligation to Disseminate LOAC/IHL’ available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ other/obligation_to_disseminate.pdf, accessed on 8 July 2018.
  73. RULAC (n 35).
  74. The overall position of Nepal and south Asia has slightly improved since 2017, however the global average has gone down. Institute for Economic Stability and Peace, Global Peace Index 2018, Measuring Peace in a Complex World, 2018, pp. 2,10,17.
  75. See Havard Harge, ‘Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010–2050’, ISA Annual Convention, New York, 15–18 February 2009.
  76. Nepal does not do well on these variables according to the European Global Conflict Risk Index. European Union, ‘European Global Conflict Risk Index’ available at http://conflictrisk.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ accessed on 10 July 2018.
  77. Md. Shahid Parwez, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Conflict in Nepal’, Nepal Resident Mission Working Paper Series no. 7, Asian Development Bank, July 2006, pp. 2-5.
  78. Nicholas James Hasty, ‘On the determinants of internal armed conflict’, Masters of Political Science Thesis, Iowa State University, 2015, p. 26.
  79. See Robert Gersony, ‘Western Nepal Conflict Assessment: History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt’, Paper no 15, International Resource Group Discussion Forum; See also Krishna Hachhethu, ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: An Overview’, available at http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/midea/pdf/harticle2.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2018;
  80. ‘History of Maoist Insurgency’ available at https://raonline.ch/pages/story/np_mao_sum01.html, accessed on 15 July 2018.
  81. Upreti (n 57), p. 22.
  82. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the twenty-first century, Routledge, 2010, p. 332.
  83. Mikesell Stephen, ‘The Paradoxical Support of Nepal’s left for Comrade Gonzalo’, Himal, March/April 1993.
  84. Chiran Jung Thapa, ‘Nepal’s Armed Conflict – A Narrative of Political Mismanagement’ in V R Raghavan (ed), Internal Conflicts – A four state analysis (India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar), Vij Books India, 2013, p. 169.
  85. Here the author means that the general population could discern an insurgency in the sense that CPN-M supports were growing, and the rebellion was empirically visible, however the general population did not anticipate the insurgency to transform in to an intense and sustained armed violence.
  86. Sauvangya Shah, ‘A Himalayan Red Herring’, cited in Thapa (n 83), p. 179.
  87. The actual number of soldiers ready for deployment in combat was probably much lower. Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, Kathmandu, 2003, p. 137.
  88. In Nepal, Police were not trained not to use brute force and had no prior experience or formal training in combating insurgency and the APF was deployed only a month into its institutionalization. Shah (n 83), p. 179.
  89. The Government of Nepal as the defense replied that ‘[t]he Geneva Convention applies in the conditions of war and armed revolts. However, the current condition falls under the criminal justice system. As the legislations have been already enacted respecting the convention, the writ be voided.’ Raja Ram Dhakal et al v. His Majesty’s Government et al, WN 2942, 2059 (2002) (unofficial translation).
  90. See Sandesh Shivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, vol. 22, issue. 1, European Journal of International Law 219, 2011 available at https://tinyurl.com/yb9wkh92, accessed on 20 July 2018.
  91. Constitution of Nepal, 2075 (2015) (unofficial English translation), preamble, art. 4.
  92. ‘Global Peace Index’, 2020, available at https://tinyurl.com/yyknswgd, accessed on 29 November 2020.
  93. For example the armed violence in the Terai regions fueled by age-old ethnic tensions that manifested intensely during the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal. See Julia Strasheim, ‘No end of the peace process: federalism and ethnic violence in Nepal’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ybm68wlw, accessed on 12 July 2018.
  94. European Commission, Global Conflict Risk Assessment, 2008, p. 84.
  95. Sassoli et al (n 14), p. 33.
  96. Ibid, (Case no. 272, Civil War in Nepal), p. 2410.
  97. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, War Report Armed Conflicts in 2017, March 2018, p. 16.
  98. Upreti (n 57), p. 270.
  99. Tadic Interlocutory Appeals (n 11), para. 70. ‘Another case [of non-international armed conflict] is the crumbling of all government authority in the country, as a result of which various groups fight each other in the struggle for power’. ICRC, ‘Opinion Paper on How is the Term Armed Conflict Defined in LOAC/ IHL’, p.4, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2018. Commentary to GC I (n 24), paras. 470, 477.
  100. Geneva Academy (n 96), p. 36.
  101. Transnational armed conflicts technically can be both international or non-international.
  102. See for example the 2015 UNSC meeting memos regarding Afghanistan in ‘Global Community Must Protect War-Weary Afghanistan amid Threats to Stability, Self-Reliance, Top United Nations Official Tells Security Council’, UNSC Press Release, 15 September 2015, available at https://www.un.org/press/ en/2015/sc12050.doc.htm, accessed on 25 July 2018.
  103. Geneva Academy (n 96), p. 26.
  104. Ibid, p. 100.
  105. C. A. J. Coady, ‘The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ ychjsynx, accessed on 15 September 2020.
  106. Rule of Law in Armed Conflict (RULAC), ‘International Armed Conflict in Syria’, available at googl/5QLKwD, accessed on 25 July 2018.
  107. Ibid.
  108. See for reference Emily Crawford, ‘The Temporal and Geographical Reach of LOAC/IHL’, Research Paper no. 16/42, University of Sydney, 26 August 2017.
  109. See for reference Robin Geiss, ‘Armed violence in fragile states: Low-intensity conflicts, spillover conflicts, and sporadic law enforcement operations by third parties’, International Review of the Red Cross p. 127, 2009, volume 91: 873, pp. 127-142.
  110. Marco Milanovic, ‘On Whether LOAC/IHL Applies to Drone Strikes Outside ‘Areas of Active Hostilities’: A Response to Ryan Goodman’, EJILtalk, 5 October 2017 available at goo.gl/zr4q2n, accessed on 25 July 2018.
  111. Satarupa Bhattacharjya, ‘Nepal’s Maoist Chief Harps on Democracy’, IndiaToday, 4 December 2006.
  112. RULAC, ‘Non-international armed conflict in India’ available at http://www.rulac.org/browse/ countries/india#collapse1accord, accessed on 25 July 2018.
  113. Dipak Gupta, ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist Movement in India: Birth, Demise, and Reincarnation’, vol. 3, no.2, Democracy and Security 157, 2007, p. 158.
  114. Maximillian Morch, ‘Nepal and the Rohingya Refugees’, The Diplomat, 5 December 2017.
  115. Tom Hundley, ‘India and Pakistan are quietly making nuclear war more likely’, Vox, 4 April 2018.
  116. Geneva Academy (n 45), p. 12.
  117. The law of neutrality in IHL provides the definition of a neutral state, that is, a state which does not participate in the armed conflict. It entails rights of inviolability of the territory of a neutral state, and certain protections to the nationals of a neutral state found in the territory of a belligerent state. It also entails a duty to maintain impartiality in international relations with the belligerents of the armed conflict. For detail, see Nicholas Tsagourias and Alasdair Morrison, International Humanitarian Law, Cases, Materials and Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2018, chapter 8.
  118. For the rules on protection of aliens in occupied territories, see GC IV (n 36), arts. 48, 70; For the rules on protection of aliens in the territory of a party to a conflict, see GC IV (n 36), art. 35- 46.
  119. ‘United Nations Peacekeeping’, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/nepal, accessed on 5 December 2020.
  120. Tristan Ferraro, ‘The applicability and application of international humanitarian law to multinational forces’, International Review of the Red Cross p. 561, 2014, volume 95: 891, p. 584.
  121. Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 411.
  122. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 33 (personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission).
  123. See generally, UNSG, ‘Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law,’ (6 August 1999) UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13.
  124. Surya Deuja, ‘IHL and Peacekeeping’, South Asia Teaching Session, Kathmandu, April 2018.
  125. ‘UNSC, ‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, Report of the Secretary General’ (2004) UN Docs A/58/777.
  126. 1999 UNSC Bulletin (n 124), p. 2.
  127. One of the few cases include that of Ronghi, a member of a peacekeeping force, who was found guilty of raping and murdering a ten-year-old girl in Kosovo. United States v. Ronghi, No. ARMY 20000635, (A. Ct. Crim. A. May 27, 2003); United States v. Ronghi, 60 M.J. 83, 86 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
  128. Marco Sassoli, Lecture on Non-International Armed Conflict, 8 March 2017, University of Geneva.
  129. ‘Whom does LOAC/IHL protect?’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y5yh3c99, accessed on 28 November 2020.
  130. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 47.
  131. Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 585.
  132. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 70.
  133. Ibid, rules 87-105.
  134. Tadic Interlocutory Appeal (n 11), para. 94.
  135. Lubanga Confirmations of Charges (n 39), paras. 380-382.
  136. See ICC Statute (n 34), art. 7.
  137. ICC, ‘Situation in Guinea’ available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/guinea, accessed on 20 July 2018.
  138. ICC, ‘Situation in Venezuela’ available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/venezuela, accessed on 20 July 2018.
  139. ICC, ‘Situation in Ukraine’, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine, accessed on 20 July 2018.
  140. ICC, ‘Situation in the Phillipines’, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/philippines, accessed on 20 July 2018.
  141. ‘Is environmental destriction a crime against humanity’, TheWashingtonPost, 16 September 2016.
  142. See ‘Genocide’, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020 available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide, accessed on 24 November 2020.
  143. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention), art. 1.
  144. See generally, Sebastian von Einsiedel and Cale Salih, Conflict Prevention in Nepal, World Bank Background Paper on Study on Conflict Prevention, April 2017.
  145. Olivier Bangerter, Internal Control Codes of Conduct within Insurgent Armed Groups, An Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey, 2012, p. 45.
  146. See Genocide Convention (n 143), art. 1; Also see ICC Statute (n 34), art. 6.
  147. UNGA, ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011’, 19 December 2016, UN Doc. A/71/L.48; OHCHR, ‘Situation of human rights in Myanmar’, 3 April 2017, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/34/22; OHCHR, ‘Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’ available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/sp/pages/welcomepage.aspx, accessed on 18 August 2018; UNHRC, ‘President of Human Rights Council appoints Members of Commission of Inquiry on 2018 protests in Occupied Palestinian Territory’, available at goo.gl/cf3APM, accessed on 18 August 2018.
  148. The author finds the title of this report very imprudent for a report that wants to persuade a state to implement its finds and recommendations, and does not agree with some of its legal conclusions including those on universal jurisdiction, but see Human Rights Watch, No Law, No Justice, No State For Victims, 2020, available at https://tinyurl.com/y9dtll25, accessed on 9 December 2020.
  149. ILC, Fragmentation of International Law, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, p. 61.
  150. Ibid.
  151. Ibid.
  152. Ibid.
  153. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 2004, para. 106
  154. Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict’, p. 31, available at https://tinyurl.com/create.php, accessed on 1 December 2020.
  155. UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36; UN Human Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 35, Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (read only paras. 63-65); UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, UN Doc. A/HRC/30/37, paras. 27-32, 94-6.
  156. AP I (n 29), art. 51(3); AP II (n 33), art. 13(3).
  157. See generally Corn (n 154).
  158. Ibid, p. 31,
  159. Ibid, p. 34.
  160. Kale Tamang et al v Government of Nepal et al, WN 0238, cited in Govinda Bandi (ed.), Transitional Justice and Right to a Remedy, Nepal Bar Association, 2013, pp. 151-158.
  161. Buddhibahadur Praja et al v Government of Nepal et al. WN 2448 of 2063 (2006, cited in Ibid, pp.141-148.
  162. Kevin Von Heller, ‘Another Round on IHL and IHRL’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ y8x2ydzq, accessed on 2 December 2020.
  163. Human Rights Watch (n 147), pp. 30-31.
  164. Ibid.
  165. Nepal Conflict Report (n 58), p. 82.
  166. See Surya Prasad Sharma v. Nepal, Human Rights Committee Communication 1469/2006, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006; Rabi Khatri Case Study, in Nepal Conflict Report (n 98), p. 84.
  167. International Crisis Group, Nepal: Peace and Justice, Asia Report no. 184, 14 January 2010, p. 12-13.
  168. Nepal Conflict Report (n 58), p. 85.
  169. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights Violations in Nepal Baseline Study, October 2017, p. 8.
  170. Sushil Pyakurel et al v Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal et al, WN 1094 cited in Govinda Bandi (ed.), Transitional Justice and Right to a Remedy, Nepal Bar Association, 2013, pp. 116-121.
  171. International Crisis Group (n 166), p. 14.
  172. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 113 (treatment of the dead).
  173. Case Study of Ujjwal Kumar Shrestha in ICJ (n 169), p.9; Maina Sunwar Case, Devi Sunwar v. District Police Office Kavre et al, WN 0641, 2063 (2013).
  174. Commentary to Common Article 3 (n 24), p. 698.
  175. Nepal Conflict Report (n 58), p. 23.
  176. Dewan Rai, ‘TRC records 295 complaints on sexual assault’, The Kathmandu Post, 2 December 2016.
  177. See ‘Conflict-era sexual violence victims yet to be identified’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yb2nhya4, accessed on 12 December 2020.
  178. See Human Rights Watch, Silenced and Forgotten: Survivors of Nepal’s Conflict-Era Sexual Violence, 2014.
  179. The ICC Ntaganda decision on the confirmation of charges qualifies rape and sexual slavery of child soldiers committed by members of same group as war crimes. Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Confirmation of Charges, 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, paras. 76-82.
  180. Seira Tamang, ‘Remembering Doramba’, August 2004, NepaliTimes, available at https://tinyurl.com/ y7a6avme, accessed on 29 November 2020.
  181. Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 389.
  182. Ibid.
  183. Ibid.
  184. The choice of the word reflects the necessity to first revisit the transitional justice mechanism in Nepal as discussed later, and that this issue requires a separate discussion.
  185. The reader can refer to the ICC’s own Rules of Evidence and Procedure to gain a fair idea of what thought-out rules look like.
  186. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the admissibility of four documents, 13 June 2008, ICC 01/04-01/06, para. 31; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Decision on prosecutor’s appeal on admissibility of evidence, 16 February 1999, ICTY-1995-14/1, para. 15.
  187. See generally, Tika Prasad Bhatta, ‘Out and about in Doramba’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ycvx3a75, accessed on 10 December 2020.
  188. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Unlawful Killings and Summary Executions by Nepali Security Forces’, https:// tinyurl.com/ycms8akx, accessed on 11 December 2020.
  189. Killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy is prohibited. LOAC/IHL (n 19), rule 65.
  190. Bhatta (n 186).
  191. ‘Case study of Reena Rasaili’, in Human Rights Watch and Advocacy Forum, Adding Salt to Injury, 2011, p. 17.
  192. Yubaraj Giri v. Nepal, Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1761/2008, CCPR/ C/101/D/1761/2008 (2008).
  193. Maina Sunwar Case (n 172); ‘Case study of Sahid Ullah Dewan’, in Human Rights Watch and Advocacy Forum (n 190), p. 29.
  194. Mukunda Sedhai v Nepal, Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1865/2009, UN Doc. CCPR/ C/108/D/1865/2009 (2009).
  195. Monique Crettol and Anne-Marie La Rosa, ‘The missing and transitional justice: the right to know and the fight against impunity’, International Review of the Red Cross p. 355, volume 88: 862, p. 356.
  196. Customary IHL Database (19), rule 98 (on enforced disappearance)
  197. Nepal Conflict Report (n 58), pp. 19, 20.
  198. Human Rights Watch (n 147), p. 16.
  199. ‘Armed Conflict victim returns home after 18 years’, The Himalayan Times, 1 May 2017.
  200. Rajendra Dhakal v. HMG et. al., 2007 cited in Bandi (n 159).
  201. Ibid.
  202. As expressed in the common article 3 to the GCs.
  203. It derives from the obligation to care for the sick and the wounded. Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 770.
  204. Ibid.
  205. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 6 (civilians’ loss of protection of attack).
  206. Thapa (n 83), p. 169.
  207. International Crisis Group (n 166), p. 13.
  208. See Human Rights Watch (n 147), p. 118
  209. International Crisis Group (n 166), p. 12.
  210. Ibid, p. 13.
  211. Upreti (n 57), pp. 277-8.
  212. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 38 (attacks against cultural properties).
  213. ‘The Medieval Town of Tansen’, available at https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5262/, accessed on 10 August 2018.
  214. Kai Weise, ‘Conflict and heritage destruction’, The Himalayan Times, 8 July 2017.
  215. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 129 (the act of displacement)
  216. Mercy Corps (n 63), p. 75.
  217. ‘Case no. 272, Civil War in Nepal’ in Sassoli (n 14), p. 2411.
  218. Nepal Conflict Report (n 58), p. 86.
  219. Customary IHL Database (n 10), rule 16 (target verification).
  220. Ibid, rule 12 (the definition of indiscriminate attack).
  221. Ibid, rule 136 (recruitment of child soldiers).
  222. See generally, UNSG, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Nepal,’ UN Doc.
  223. S/2006/1007, 20 December 2006.
  224. See the general construction of article 77 of AP I.
  225. International Crisis Group (n 166), p. 13.
  226. Ibid.
  227. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 145 (reprisal upon civilian population).
  228. Mercy Corps (n 63), p. 90.
  229. Arms and Ammunitions Act, Nepal, 2019 (1962).
  230. The Explosives Act, Nepal, 2018 (1961).
  231. OHCHR, ‘Conflict-related Disappearances in Bardiya District’ available at goo.gl/nyNV9K, accessed on 10 August 2018.
  232. HRTMCC Nepal, ‘Field Report in Maoists Trapped Civilian Bus in Landmine at Bandarmudhe Stream in Madi of Chitwan District’, 14 June 2005.
  233. Jean-Marie Henckaert, ‘Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict’, International Review of the Red Cross p.175, 2005, volume 87:857, p. 194.
  234. Ibid.
  235. Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal, Geneva, 2012, p. 9.
  236. Ibid.
  237. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 52 (pillage).
  238. Bhojraj Timilsina et al v. Nepal Congress Party et al, WN 2063-WO-0920 (2006) in Bandi (n 159), p. 132.
  239. See Tej Bahadur Bhandari v Nepal, Human Rights Committee Communication No. 2031/2011, UN Doc.
  240. CCPR/C/112/D/2031/2011.
  241. Liladhar Bhandari et al v Government of Nepal, WN 0863 cited in Bandi (n 159), p. 172.
  242. Francesca Romanin et. al., Natural Resource Grabbing: An International Law Perspective, Brill Publications, 2015, p. 414.
  243. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 25 (medical personnel).
  244. Ibid, rules 36-7 (open towns and non-defended localities).
  245. Ibid, rule 50 (destruction and seizure of property of an adversary).
  246. Ibid, rule 15 (precautions in attack).
  247. Ibid, rule 103 (collective punishments).
  248. Ibid, rule 54 (attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population).
  249. ICRC, ‘jus ad bellum and jus in bello’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y3o3xcnn, accessed on 23 November 2020.
  250. Jayakishor Labh v District Police Office Dhanusha, WN 063-WO-0681 in Bandi (n 159), p. 114.
  251. Purnamaya Lama v District Police Office Kavre et al, WN 1231/2063, in Ibid, p. 100.
  252. Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Nepal’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/NPL/CO/2 ,15 April 2014, p. 2.
  253. ICJ, Achieving Justice for Gross Human Rights Violations in Nepal Baseline Study, October 2017, p. 16.
  254. Ibid.
  255. Lubanga Confirmation of Charges (n 39), paras. 287-288.
  256. See for example ‘Deuba defends army, police mobilised during armed conflict’, The Himalayan Times, 3 June 2016.
  257. The author has revised her previous opinion upon study of theories of war, specially Clausewitz and Mao.
  258. Clausewitz (n 1), p. 73.
  259. Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 58-9.
  260. Francis Miyata and John Nicholson, ‘Clausewitzian Principles of Maoist Insurgency’ available at https:// tinyurl.com/y29y954q, accessed on 22 November 2020.
  261. Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War, p. 229, available at http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html#s1, accessed on 23 November 2020.
  262. Olivier Bangerter, ‘Reasons why armed groups choose to respect humanitarian law or not’, International Review of the Red Cross p.353, 2011, volume 90:882, pp. 356, 369-70.
  263. ‘List of multilateral treaties signed by Nepal’, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Nepal, p.
  264. , available at https://tinyurl.com/ycrocygs, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  265. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 143 (states must encourage the teaching of international humanitarian law to the civilian population).
  266. Suman Adhikari et al v Government of Nepal, WN 0032, 2070 (2013) (unofficial translation).
  267. See Jean Pictet, ‘Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y87f47m5, accessed on 12 December 2020; Also see A. Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, Prometheus Books, 1987, preface and chapter II; Also see UNGA, ‘Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’, UNGA Resolution A/RES/46/182.
  268. Pictet (n 263), See generally Manoj Kumar Sinha, ‘Hinduism and International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross p. 285, 2005, volume 87:858, pp. 285-294; Ahmed Al Dawoody, ‘IHL and Islam: An Overview’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ybsp8gjd, accessed on 23 November 2020.
  269. Jaideep Prabhu, ‘The Hindu Art of War’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yc56fltw, accessed on 23 November 2020.
  270. William Edward Hall, A Treatise of International Law, pp. 48–9, cited in Frederic Megret, ‘From “savages” to “unlawful combatants”: a postcolonial look at international law’s “other”, p. 14, available at https:// tinyurl.com/yxz59x32, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  271. Ibid.
  272. For example, Sinha likens Bhramhastra to a nuclear weapon, both are intended to be used as a last resort under extreme events. Sinha (n 264).
  273. For example, a scholar argues that the West is intentionally pushing an aggressive narrative about Jihad, whereas there are different schools of thoughts about Jihad, and some of them theorize a humanitarian interpretation of Jihad. See generally Faiz Bakhsh, ‘Compatibility between International Humanitarian Law and Islamic Law or War (Jihad)’ p. 75, PETITA, 2019, volume 4:1.
  274. Juliane Garcia Ravel and Madalena Vasconcelos Rosa, ‘IHL in action: seven patterns of respect’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y9pr9kr3, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  275. Megret (n 266), p. 33.
  276. Amnesty for war crimes is rather a contentious topic within the political sphere. However, studies demonstrate that amnesty combined with prosecution are more common than is assumed.
  277. Gregory Shaffer, ‘Legal Realism and International Law’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y7pec99c, accessed on 25 November 2020.
  278. There are several theories on the legitimacy of international law, nonetheless the majority opinion pins primacy on state consent. Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy in International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, available at https://tinyurl.com/y72jhq7a, accessed on 28 November 2020.
  279. While common article 3 to the GCs provides the bare minimum rules for situations during a NIAC when a person may find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict, the fundamental guarantees under article 75 of AP1 and article 4 of APII applies to everyone at all situations during IAC and NIAC including those of hostilities.
  280. ‘Speakers Argue About Calls for Universal Ratification of Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions, as Sixth Committee Takes Up Annual Report’, UNGA Meetings Coverage, 4 November 2020, available at https://tinyurl.com/y8677knh, accessed on 26 November 2020.
  281. But see post-colonialism critique of international law making process.
  282. Jean-Marie Henckaert, ‘Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict’, International Review of the Red Cross p.175, 2005, 87:857, p. 212.
  283. ICRC, Commentary the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Cambridge University Press, 2016, para. 1688.
  284. Sassoli (n 14), p. 343.
  285. Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, ICRC, p. 12.
  286. Marco Sassoli, ‘Introducing a sliding-scale of obligations to address the fundamental inequality between armed groups and states?’, International Review of the Red Cross p.427, 2011, volume 93, p. 428.
  287. AP I (n 29), art. 1(4); Commentary to AP I (n 24), para. 3619.
  288. Frederic Megret, ‘The Humanitarian Problem with Drones’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yccsg9nk, accessed on 3 December 2020.
  289. See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of New Armed Conflicts, 2019, pp. 26-29.
  290. Ibid, p. 31.
  291. Marc Weller, The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 465.
  292. The author again stresses that the LOAC/IHL-like standards in religious scriptures cannot be compared to the normative field of LOAC. This exercise is for illustrative purpose. For a comprehensive LOAC/IHL ‘value-based’ assessment of Mahabharata, see Sinha (n 23), pp. 285-294.
  293. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 92 (prohibition on mutilations unless required by the state of health of a person under generally accepted medical standards).
  294. Ibid, rule 70 (prohibition on use of means of warfare which are of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering).
  295. A combatant is targetable at all times, including at night. A sleeping combatant is not hors de combat and thus will remain ‘in combat’. However, targeting combatants who are sleeping may be prohibited by military manuals and remains a moral question even without any ensuing legal consequence. Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law in War, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, p. 202.
  296. It has been proposed that the distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum is blurring. Nevertheless, the the separation between two legal domains remains the majority opinion. See generally Geoffrey S. Corn, ‘Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello’, International Law Studies p. 58, 2011, volume 88.
  297. AP I (n 29), preamble.
  298. Tsu uses the metaphors of ‘sun and earth’. Sun Tsu, The Art of War, ss. 1.13, 1.4, 1.7, available at https:// suntzusaid.com/index/heaven, accessed on 10 December 2020.
  299. Also see Marco Sassoli, Antoine A Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does Law Protection in War?, vol I, 3rd edition, p. 93.
  300. See AP I (n 29), art. 51(5)(b); For a detailed explanation of how customs are formed in international law, particularly in LOAC/IHL, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘History and Sources’, in Ben Saul and Dapo Akande (eds), The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 1-9.
  301. In the words of a Youtube commentator completely unaware about LOAC, “law of war was the ‘stupidest s**t he’d ever heard”. Thomas Foster, ‘What has law got to do with armed conflict’, International Review of the Red Cross p. 994, vol. 99:904, 2017, p. 994.
  302. Yasemin Unal, ‘Terrorist or Freedom Fighter’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y6cf9fgf, accessed on 21 November 2020.
  303. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 1 (the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants).
  304. Commentary to GC I (n 24), para. 614.
  305. Human Rights Watch, Nepal, Waiting for Justice, Unpunished Crimes from Nepal’s Armed Conflict, p. 2.
  306. Jayakishor Labh case (n 247).
  307. AP I (n 29), art. 51; AP II (n 33), art. 13(2).
  308. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 2.
  309. See for example Aaron Fichtelberg, Law at the Vanishing Point: A Philosophical Analysis of International Law, Ashgate, 2008, pp. 1-202.
  310. Goldsmith and Posner (n 7), p. 7.
  311. Ibid, pp. 13, 84-5.
  312. AP I (n 29), art. 80.
  313. AP II (n 33), art. 1(1).
  314. AP I (n 29), art. 80.
  315. As stipulated in articles 47, 48, 127 and 144 respectively of the four Geneva Conventions.
  316. GC IV (n 36), art. 145.
  317. GCs (n 36), arts. 50, 51, 130, 147 (respectively); AP I (n 29), art. 85.
  318. GC I (n 36), art. 54; GC II (n 36), art. 55.
  319. Anton Petrov, ‘Lawfare? We need the states to interpret international humanitarian law’, p. 7, https:// tinyurl.com/yxztfumz, accessed on 19 December 2020.
  320. Center for International Policy Studies, ‘The Effects of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: A Summary of Empirical Research Findings and Implications for Analysts and Practitioners’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yxbvnwle, accessed on 19 December 2020.
  321. AP I (n 29), art. 90 (c) (i).
  322. Ibid, art. 90 (c) (iii).
  323. ‘Case Study on International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission’, in Sassoli (n 14).
  324. Petrov (n 315), p. 4.
  325. ICC Statute (n 34), arts. 5, 6, 7, 8.
  326. ICC, ‘About ICC’, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/about, accessed on 20 August 2018.
  327. Otto Triffterer, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – A Commentary, 2016, p. 20.
  328. E.g. UNGA, ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011’, 19 December 2016, UN Doc. A/71/L.48; E.g. OHCHR, ‘Situation of human rights in Myanmar’, 3 April 2017, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/34/22; E.g. OHCHR, ‘Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/ sp/pages/welcomepage.aspx, accessed on 18 August 2018; E.g. UNHRC, ‘President of Human Rights Council appoints Members of Commission of Inquiry on 2018 protests in Occupied Palestinian Territory’, available at goo.gl/cf3APM, accessed on 18 August 2018.
  329. David Sloss, ‘Schizophrenic Treaty Law’, Texas International Law Journal p. 15, 2007, volume 43, p. 17.
  330. Treaty Act, Nepal, 1990, art. 9(2).
  331. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 478–80 (the US, D.D.C. 2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (the US, D.D.C. 2004).
  332. Derek Jinks and David Sloss, ‘Is the (US) President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?’, Cornell Law Review, 2004, volume 90, p. 1025.
  333. Raja Ram Dhakal Case, Raja Ram Dhakal et al v. His Majesty’s Government et al, WN 2942, 2059 (2002) (unofficial translation), defense written response.
  334. Ibid.
  335. Draft Geneva Conventions Bill, Nepal, 2019.
  336. E.g. Buddhibahadur Praja et al v Government of Nepal et al. WN 2448 of 2063 (2006) in Bandi (n 159), p.141-148; E.g. Kale Tamang et al v Government of Nepal et al, WN 0238 in Bandi (n 159), p. 151-158.
  337. R v Jones (Margeret) 2007 1 AC 136 (the UK); Nulyarimma v Thompson (2000, Australia) 334 Rajendra Dhakal Case (n 199).
  338. See Eyal Benvenisti and Doreen Lustig, ‘Monopolizing War: Codifying the Laws of War to Reassert Governmental Authority, 1856–1874’, European Journal of International Law p. 127, 2020, volume 31:1; Jochen Von Bernstorff, ‘Is IHL a Sham? A Reply to “Monopolizing War” by Eyal Benvenisti and Doreen Lustig’, European Journal of International Law p. 709, 2020, volume 31:2; Benvenisti and Lustig, ‘Beyond the ‘Sham’ Critique and the Narrative of Humanitarianism: A Rejoinder to Jochen von Bernstorff ’, European Journal of International Law p. 721, 2020, volume 31:2.
  339. See for example Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh and Peter M. Gollwitzer, Oxford Handbook of Human Action, Oxford University Press, 2008.
  340. Michael Bothe, ‘Compliance’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, available at https:// tinyurl.com/y6mo79um, accessed on 24 November 2020.
  341. Tullio Treves, ‘Customary International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, available at https://tinyurl.com/yyxot5hc, accessed on 24 November 2020.
  342. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, ICTY-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para. 138.
  343. Ibid.
  344. Customary IHL database (n 19), rule 140.
  345. Bothe (n 337).
  346. Ezequiel Heffes and Marcos D. Kotlik, ‘Special agreements as a means of enhancing compliance with IHL in non-international armed conflicts: An inquiry into the governing legal regime’, International Review of the Red Cross p. 1195, volume 96, p. 1199.
  347. Ibid.
  348. Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict, ‘Action Plans’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y25nwuaz, 25 November 2020.
  349. Olivier Bangerter, Internal Control Codes of Conduct within Insurgent Armed Groups, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2012, p. 11.
  350. But see the discussion in Q6 on the definition of ‘the People’.
  351. Helen Durham, ‘Why the Mine Ban Convention was worth fighting for and still is’ available at https:// tinyurl.com/y4d23guk, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  352. Helen Durham, ‘Atrocities in conflict mean we need the Geneva conventions more than ever’, The Guardian, 5 April 2016, available at goo.gl/Ee881r, accessed on 5 July 2018; Helen Durham has been the Director of International Law and Policy at the ICRC since 2014. She has over 20 years’ experience in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, ‘Law and Policy Contributor’, https://blogs.icrc.org/law-andpolicy/ contributor/helen-durham/, accessed on 24 November 2020.
  353. Strachan (n 256), p. 48.
  354. Tom Stafford, ‘Psychology: Why bad news dominates the headline’ https://tinyurl.com/y46vk2m3, accessed on 26 November 2020.
  355. Steven Pinker, ‘The media exaggerates negative news. This distortion has consequences’ available at https://tinyurl.com/y7pe5jkt, accessed on 26 November 2020.
  356. ICRC, ‘IHL in Action’ available at https://ihl-in-action.icrc.org/, accessed on 26 November 2020.
  357. Ibid.
  358. Ibid.
  359. Ibid.
  360. Durham (n 349).
  361. IHL in Action (n 353).
  362. Bangerter (n 144), p. 48.
  363. Conflict transformation has four elements: 1) actor transformation: internal change within the parties to the conflict; 2) issue transformation: alternation of the political agenda of the conflict; 3) rule transformation: norm involved in the conflict and limits within which the parties conduct their relations; structural transformation: involves change in the whole structure of inter-party relations. Raimo Vayrynen, cited in Upreti (n 57), p. 229.
  364. Altea Rossi, ‘Training Armed Forces in IHL: Just a Matter of Law?’ available at https://tinyurl.com/ y5yw8z9f, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  365. Bangerter (n 144), p. 46.
  366. Charles Dunlap, “Lawfare 101: Primer” available at https://tinyurl.com/yy2kyg6a, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  367. Tanisha Fazal and Margarita Konaev, ‘Can International Humanitarian Law Restrain Armed Groups? Lessons from NGO Work on Anti-Personnel Landmines’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y9y5v42n, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  368. Dunlap (n 363).
  369. Petrov (n 315).
  370. Bangerter (n 259), p. 357.
  371. Violation of IHL may be a direct military advantage but seldom an overall military advantage as actors lose trust of people. Ibid, p. 361; Experiences of the 36 years (19960-1996) of Guatemalan armed conflict as well as Columbian conflict show that without respecting the basic human rights of people, violent conflict cannot be transformed. Nepalese conflicts’ geographical radius and intensity increased due to radical tactics used by first the Nepal police and Armed Police Force. Upreti (n 57).
  372. Bangerter (n 259), p. 367.
  373. Ibid, p. 353.
  374. Ibid, p. 354.
  375. Tom Burns and Ewa Roszkowska, ‘Rational Choice Theory: Toward a Psychological, Social, and Material Contextualization of Human Choice Behavior’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y2a94hom, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  376. Ibid.
  377. See generally, Customary IHL Database (n 19).
  378. AP I (n 29), arts. 32-3; Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 117 (amnesty).
  379. Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 158.
  380. AP II (n 33), art. 6.2; Customary IHL Database (n 19), rule 159.
  381. Ibid.
  382. Comprehensive Peace Accord, Nepal Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 22 November 2006, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b3f7a104.html, accessed on 27 November 2020.
  383. Office of the Attorney General of Nepal, Annual Report, Kathmandu, 2008.
  384. Raju Prasad Chapagain, ‘Withdrawal of criminal charges and other forms of amnesty in Nepal: Reflections on the relevant national and international legal framework’, Nepal Judicial Academy Journal p.186, 2010, vol. IV, p. 186.
  385. For example, see article 53 of the Muluki Criminal Code of Nepal which stipulates that it is a crime to wage war against Nepal.
  386. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted on 20 December 2006 (Enforced Disappearance Convention), arts. 4, 11; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on 10 December 1984 (Convention against Torture/CAT), arts. 4, 7.
  387. Customary IHL Database (n 98), art. 98.
  388. Rajendra Dhakal case (n 159).
  389. See chapter 16 of the Muluki Country Code of Nepal.
  390. International Law Commission, Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, 2019, art. 1.
  391. Ibid, arts. 6, 7, 8.
  392. Antonio Coco, ‘The Universal Duty to Establish Jurisdiction over and Investigate Crimes against Humanity: Preliminary Remarks on draft Articles 7, 8, 9 and 11 by the International Law Commission’, p. 11, available at https://tinyurl.com/y6gryxc6, accessed on 19 December 2020.
  393. Kumar Lama v R [2014] EWCA Crim 1729 (Court of Appeal) (Unreported).
  394. See Sneha Shrestha, ‘The Curious Case of Colonel Kumar Lama: Its origins and impact in Nepal and the United Kingdom, and its contribution to the discourse on Universal Jurisdiction’, pp. 41-3 available at https://tinyurl.com/y6lqu3mc, accessed on 30 November 2020.
  395. ‘Parliament approves proposal to curb universal jurisdiction powers’ JURIST, 12 February 2014 available at https://tinyurl.com/yxtrk5y6, accessed on 30 November 2020.
  396. Ibid.
  397. Kumar Lama v R [2014] EWCA Crim 1729 (Court of Appeal) (Unreported).
  398. Delegate from Mexico, UNGA Sixth Committee, 10 October 2018 available at https://tinyurl.com/ yy39uhn5, accessed on 29 November 2020.
  399. Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World – 2012 Update (2012).
  400. Trial International, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Report 2019, p.11 available at https://tinyurl.com/ y68jzqay, accessed on 29 November 2020.
  401. Xavier Phillippe, ‘The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two principles intermesh?’, International Review of the Red Cross p.375, 2006, volume 88: 862, p. 376.
  402. Ibid.
  403. Ibid.
  404. JURIST (n 392).
  405. UNGA Sixth Committee, 10 October 2018 available at https://tinyurl.com/yy39uhn5, accessed on 29 November 2020.
  406. Tadic Interlocutory Appeals (n 11), para. 62; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Judgement, 10 December 1998, ICTY-95-17/1, para. 156; Democrutic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, para. 51; Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 ILR 298; Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 1985, 603 F.Supp.1468; 776 F.2d 571.
  407. Draft Articles on CAH (n 387).
  408. ILC, Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, with commentaries, 2019, UN Doc. A/74/10, p.24-5, available at https://tinyurl.com/y4ezoe4m, accessed on 20 December 2020.
  409. James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edition, 2012, p. 456.
  410. ICC Statute (n 34), art. 13(b).
  411. S.M.H. Nouwen and W. G. Werner. ‘Doing Justice To The Political: The International Criminal Court In Uganda And Sudan: A Rejoinder To Bas Schotel’, European Journal of International Law, 2011, pp. 1161 1164.
  412. Jochen Von Bernstroff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen, Believing in Universal Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 48.
  413. Jiaming Shen, ‘The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe’, Penn State International Law Review, 1999, volume 17, p. 31.
  414. Ibid, p. 37.
  415. Marlti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge University Press, p. 308.
  416. Katerina Mansour and Laura Riches, ‘Peace v Justice: A False Dichotomy’, Contemporary Issues in Conflict Resolution, Paris School of International Affairs, 2017, p. 4.
  417. Patrick Wegner, ‘ICC Complementarity, Positive Peace and Comprehensive Approaches in Transitional Justice’ available at goo.gl/BZv1vv, accessed on 15 August 2018.
  418. Katerina Mansour and Laura Riches, ‘Peace v Justice: A False Dichotomy’, Contemporary Issues in Conflict Resolution, Paris School of International Affairs, 2017, p. 4.
  419. J. Malamud-Goti, ‘Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals’, Human Rights Quarterly, 1990, volume 12:1, p. 1; Payam Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities’, American Journal of International Law, 2001, volume 95(1), pp. 7-31; For critical discussion regarding the flaws in the ‘prosecution of international crime creates deterrence’ argument, see Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 190-191; Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, Human Rights Quarterly p. 573, 2002, pp. 591-2; David. Wippman, ‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, Fordham International Law Journal p. 473, 1999, pp. 473-488.
  420. United Nations Security Council, ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’, Report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, para. 23.
  421. UN, Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 2005, principle 19.
  422. ‘Parties in agreement on criminal case withdrawals’, The República, 6 March 2012.
  423. The court has held withdrawals incompatible with human rights and humanitarian law obligations. The court also held that armed conflict case withdrawals cannot annul punishment and reparation for war offences. Government of Nepal v. Gagan Rai Yadav et al, WN 3302 in Bandi (n 159), pp. 207-214.
  424. Dhiraj Pokhrel, Nuances of De Facto Amnesty: A Case of Nepal, MA Human Rights Thesis, Central European University, pp. 26-27.
  425. Ram Kumar Bhandari, ‘Transitional Justice in Nepal: Perspective of Victims’, available at goo.gl/1nxgjg, accessed on 20 August 2018.
  426. ‘Nepal: Stalling on Justice for Conflict-Era Crimes’, TelegraphNepal, available at https://tinyurl.com/ yykzkzrs, accessed on 22 December 2020.
  427. Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘Transitional Justice and Theories of Change: Towards evaluation as understanding’, International Journal of Transitional Justice p.280, 2020, p.280.
  428. Center for International Policy Studies (n 316), p. 17
  429. Ibid, p. 43.
  430. Ibid, p. 31
  431. Barahona de Brito, Alexandra, Carmen González-Enríquez and Paloma Aguilar (eds), The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 30, 312.
  432. Center for International Policy Studies (n 316), p. 36.
  433. Center for International Policy Studies, ‘Impact of Transitional Justice’, available at https://tinyurl.com/ yxaunkmr, accessed on 20 December 2020.
  434. David Wippman (n 416) (emphasis added).
  435. Pierre Hazan, ‘Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: a framework for evaluating transitional justice’, International Review of the Red Cross p.19, 2006, volume 88:861, p. 46.
  436. Center for International Policy Studies (n 316), 19.
  437. Sandra Rubli, ‘Rethinking the Social World: The Politics of Transitional Justice in Burundi’, Africa Spectrum, 2013, volume 48:1, p. 4.
  438. ‘Afghanistan: Revitalize transitional Justice System – UN Human Rights Commissioner’, available at https://tinyurl.com/y65u2sr2, accessed on 28 December 2020.
  439. Yvette Selim, Transitional Justice in Nepal: Interests, Victims and Agency, Routledge/Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA), 2018, p. 175
  440. Center for International Policy Studies (n 316), p. 5.
  441. Shen (n 410), p. 42.
  442. Suman Adhikari Case (n 262), p. 25.
  443. United Nations Security Council (n 417).
  444. See generally Center for International Policy Studies (n 316).
  445. Center for International Policy Studies (n 316), p. 43.
  446. Ibid, p. 6-7.
  447. Ibid, p. 25.
  448. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena (eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice, Cambridge University Press, p. 430.
  449. ICTJ, Truth Seeking, 2013, p. 24.
  450. But see contrary opinion in Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Editorial’, International Journal of Transitional Justice p. 325, 2014, volume 8:3, pp. 325-338.
  451. With caution, see Jeff Halper, ‘How Israel undermines International Law through lawfare’, available at https://tinyurl.com/yygp4zgk, accessed on 29 December 2020.
  452. Ibid.
  453. Petrov (n 315), p. 4.
  454. Ibid.